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Abstract 
 The concepts like knowledge and interaction have acquired many different 
meanings in human and social sciences and consequently, the knowledge construction 
in cognitive science, computing, socio-biology and dialogicality refers to diverse 
processes. This article draws attention to such diversities in meanings of knowledge 
and interaction and to their ontologies. It first discusses the Cartesian, connectivist and 
neuro-biological approaches to knowledge and processing of information. It then 
presents a dialogical theory of knowledge based on the Ego-Alter interaction. It argues 
that knowledge is co-constructed jointly by the Ego-Alter, leading to the epistemological 
triadic relation the Ego-Alter-Object. Dialogical theory brings communication into the 
centre of the theory of knowledge. The last part of the paper discusses the construction 
of knowledge in and through communication genres, giving as examples persuasion 
and argumentation. 
Key words: Knowledge; Interaction; Dialogicality; Ego-Alter; Ego-Alter-Object; 
Communication genre. 
Resumo 
Conceitos como conhecimento e interacção têm assumido muitos sentidos 
diferentes nas ciências humanas e sociais e, consequentemente, a construção do 
conhecimento em ciência cognitiva, computação, sócio-biologia e dialogicalidade 
refere-se a diversos processos. Este artigo chama a atenção para estas diversidades 
nos sentidos do conhecimento e da interacção e para as suas ontologias. Começa por 
discutir as abordagens do conhecimento e processamento de informação Cartesianas, 
associacionistas e neuro-biológicas. Apresenta, em seguida, a teoria dialógica do 
conhecimento, baseada na interacção Ego-Alter. Assume que o conhecimento é 
co-construído conjuntamente pelo Ego-Alter, levando à relação triádica epistemológica 
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Ego-Alter-Objecto. A teoria dialógica traz a comunicação para o centro da teoria do 
conhecimento. A última parte deste artigo discute a construção do conhecimento em e 
através dos estilos de comunicação, dando como exemplos a persuasão e a 
argumentação.  
Palavras-chave: Conhecimento; Interacção; Dialogicalidade; Ego-Alter; 
Ego-Alter-Objecto; Estilo de comunicação. 
 
‘Knowledge’, the term used abundantly both is mundane and in scientific 
language, takes on many different meanings and consequently, the ‘construction’ or 
‘acquisition of knowledge’ refers to a variety of processes that may have very little, or 
indeed, nothing in common. Thus, if this special issue focuses on ‘knowledge 
construction as a dialogical or interactive endeavour’, it is concerned with a very 
different meaning of ‘knowledge’ than, for example, the meanings that are used by 
cognitive, biological, socio-biological or computational scientists. While until two or 
three decades ago the construction or acquisition of knowledge referred mostly to the 
question as to whether, and to what extent, the human mind mirrors the external world 
correctly, or whether mental representations are biased by language, context or 
otherwise, such questions have become, today, at least in some cases, obsolete and 
even meaningless (see below). 
One can suggest that the diversity of approaches in the study of knowledge 
during the last two decades has been due to technological advances in the brain 
research and this also implies the changes of some basic epistemic concepts, including 
that of knowledge itself. When discussing interactional or dialogical knowledge, one 
cannot ignore these conceptual changes for several reasons. Above all, one cannot 
disregard the fact that psychologists who are involved in research in hard sciences like 
computation or neurobiology imply that the ‘scientific’ concept of knowledge in genes or 
brain cells is, or could become, also applicable to human knowledge. Since such a 
hypothesis is totally incongruent with the dialogical theory of knowledge, it is important 
to bring it into the open discussion in order to explain the differences in presuppositions 
on which these diverse approaches are based. Moreover, the dialogical theory of 
knowledge can expose its full meaning only if confronted with other theories of 
knowledge. As an alternative approach, it operates at a particular level of 
understanding and is irreducible to the kinds of knowledge based on simple sensory 
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units or information in genes and memes, as we shall see below. 
Considering these matters, the purpose of this article is twofold; first, to draw 
attention to diverse meanings of knowledge and interaction and to their ontologies; 
and, second, to present the meaning of ‘dialogical knowledge’. Within the latter context, 
I shall focus in this article on the construction of social knowledge in and through 
communicative genres and on its societal implications. 
The Disappearance of the Object of Knowledge 
From the Cartesian doubt to the disposal of reality 
Since the publication of Harré and Secord (1972) classic book on The 
Explanation of Social Behaviour, it has become commonplace to raise critiques against 
the Cartesian individualistic and static theory of knowledge, which has dominated, 
since the 17th century, cognitively orientated human and social sciences. The main line 
of the critical argument goes like this: 
The question as to how the human mind acquires knowledge of the external 
world has been, in the history of European scholarship, based on the idea that the 
individual knower accepts sensory information coming from objects, e.g. rocks, plants, 
stars, or even nations or systems of democracy, and that the mind re-constructs such 
information into a meaningful percept (or a mental representation), mirroring the image 
of the object in question. The individual knower of course is never sure whether he/she 
mirrors the external world correctly. Therefore, there is always doubt about the verity of 
knowledge  due to a possible deception of senses. And thus, skepticism with respect to 
what one knows never disappears. 
All scholars from Plato through to Descartes, Locke and Kant have adopted 
some version of this general model of doubt. Their philosophical approaches have 
subsequently strongly influenced the development of cognitive sciences and 
specifically, the answer to the question concerning the relation between the individual 
seeking knowledge and the object to be known. The Kantian model has been 
particularly pervasive. Humans only obtain ‘knowledge’ of appearances of worldly 
objects but they remain totally ignorant of things-in-themselves; there is no access to 
things as they really are. For example, the distinguished cognitive psychologist Neisser 
(1967) drew attention to the ‘fact’ that although there is no doubt that the world of trees, 
people, books and other objects actually exists and that this world has a great deal to 
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do with people’s experience, nevertheless, ‘we have no direct, immediate access to the 
world, nor to any of its properties’ (Neisser, 1967, p.3). What we know about the real 
world is only mediated to us by senses and through interpretation and re-interpretation 
of sensory information. 
In view of this, the problem for the researcher was to find out how the individual, 
who reasons and thinks, can minimize the effect of phenomena that produce false 
knowledge on the one hand and, bring about conditions that maximize true knowledge, 
on the other hand. 
Language and culture as militating against the acquisition of true knowledge 
As early as in the 17th century, the British philosopher John Locke, in his 
famous book on the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), suggested a 
tight association between language and the theory of knowledge. According to him, 
words can both facilitate and hinder knowledge. The correct use of words means 
making correct representations and so, facilitating knowledge. In contrast, the abuse 
and wrong use of words prevents the perfection of knowledge. For example, speakers 
may take words for things rather than treat them as representations; they may give 
words ambiguous meanings and wrong interpretations; sometimes they use them 
rhetorically or without having clear ideas about what they are saying. 
The belief that language can ‘bias’ information and hinder scientific knowledge 
has persisted until today. Only pure facts and ‘neutral’ language, which is not 
influenced by emotions and which does not have imprecise meanings is suited for 
science, including social science, argues the sociologist and philosopher Ernest 
Gellner (1992; 1998). Moreover, as Linell (2005, p.138) shows, the idea of ‘perfect 
language’, i.e. language as a maximally integrated system, ‘precise, logically 
consistent, exhaustive, and free from irrelevant features of deception, ambiguity, 
emotion, etc.’, dominates much of the contemporary linguistics. This is why the perfect 
language of science and a messy language of the human world are conceived as two 
independent and distinct entities. For linguistics, the former is based on the model of 
language used in written texts. Written texts establish ‘textual worlds detached from the 
external referential world’ (Linell, 2005, p.62) and, above all, separate it from spoken 
language in interaction. Therefore, the scientific study should remove from language all 
factors that are not related to formal logic, propositional truth and a rule-based formal 
calculus. And, only so conceived language can become a medium for the study of 
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human cognition, defined narrowly as ‘an intraindividual information processing by 
means of natural language or perhaps a more abstract, “internal” language’ (ibid, 
p.146). 
Another factor that militates against the acquisition of true knowledge is culture. 
In his influential book Reason and Culture Gellner (1992) claims that human rationality 
is universal and exists independently of culture. However, although all humans have a 
potential for rationality, it is culture and common knowledge, which may hinder this 
potential. While ‘reason is latent in us all’, ‘most cultures fail to promote it’ (ibid. p.53). 
And it is because culture militates against true knowledge that this single potential for 
rationality, which all people share, is thwarted. As a result, Gellner argues, we must 
distinguish between two kinds of knowledge: 
The first kind of knowledge, superior and entirely rational, is universal. It 
originates from the universal rationality and therefore, it is the knowledge that comes 
from the mind of the individual and the individual achieves it on his or her own. And so, 
Gellner (1998, p.3) insists that while ‘we discover truth alone, we err in groups’. This 
rational knowledge of the individual is to be found, for example, in the laws of physics 
and mathematics. The laws of these disciplines must be universally valid in order to 
count as scientific laws. Scientific rationality follows the principle that concepts must 
subscribe to the same rules in relation to evidence; rationality rejects contradiction and 
the logic of the argument must be seen through. The ideals of scientific knowledge are 
universal truths. 
The second kind of knowledge, Gellner argues, is communitarian and cultural. It 
is less rational and therefore, it is inferior to the former kind. This knowledge is the 
product of the collective. It is based on the assumption that no individual can achieve 
knowledge on his or her own, but that knowledge is essentially ‘a team game’. 
Individuals interpret and understand the world in terms of concepts, which have been 
transmitted to them from generation to generation through culture and language. While 
the former kind of knowledge is universalistic, this latter is relativistic; the former 
represents rationality and reason, whereas the latter represents irrationality and 
culture. Communitarian knowledge, it follows, is antithetical to science. 
Maximizing true knowledge through internal representations 
The ambition ‘to be scientific’ seems to have led to questions concerning the 
relationship between knowledge and mental representations on the one hand and 
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reality on the other. In fact, this question is very old going back to the beginning of the 
European philosophy. Its currect versions conceive mental representations as symbols, 
images, computations and formalisations. This conception seems to have led to the 
loss of grips with  reality and has become highly abstract. 
One example of such versions comes from the argument of Fodor (1980) which 
postulates that mental states and processes are computations. However, it is hard to 
say to what kind of reality do computations refer. It appears that according to this 
position psychology can account for the mind’s mental representations purely in terms 
of a syntactic machine and be concerned with the internal workings of its cognitive 
mechanisms. The mind (or the mind/brain) is assumed to have built-in innate concepts, 
innate representations and formalised language, which can operate both as a medium 
of representation and a medium of computation. However, innate mental 
representations do not tell us anything about reality. 
In the end, it appears that the notion of mental representation may totally loose 
its ground. Jackendoff (1992) expresses his own position with respect to mental 
representations with some hesitation: 
“A representation is not necessarily about anything; if you like, it does not 
strictly speaking represents anything…The point of this notion of representation 
is that it can in principle be instantiated in a purely combinatorial device like the 
brain as I understand it, without resort to any miraculous biological powers of 
intentionality such as Searle (1980) wishes to ascribe to the brain” (Jackendoff, 
1992, p.162). 
Having disposed of reality as an object of knowledge, theories of the mind/brain 
have reinforced their presuppositions concerning the specificity of independent 
modules, of formal computations, of synchronic cause-effect structures or of 
teleological characteristics of mental representations. At the same time, doubts seem 
to be creeping in about what the cognitive science has achieved. While praising the 
computational theory of the mind as far the best and a strikingly elegant theory of 
cognition, Fodor (2000) acknowledges that this theory accounts for no more than a little 
part of truth. There are things that are right and wrong about the idea that the mind is a 
computer and that the structure of the mind is largely modular. And he concludes: 
“In fact, what our cognitive science has done so far is mostly to throw some light 
on how much dark there is. So far, what our cognitive science has found out 
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about the mind is mostly that we don’t know how it works” (Fodor, 2000, p.100). 
The Connectionist Concept of Knowledge 
Against the Fodor model of innate concepts and innate representations, a new 
perspective, arising from the advances in neurobiology, has revived the old question of 
nature-nurture. The issue of nature versus nurture has been abundantly debated for 
centuries with respect to various matters including psychological ones, e.g. intelligence, 
personality, and physical characteristics of humans, among others. Recently, this issue 
has become a subject of scholarly debate in connectionism, a theory of neural 
information processing, which attempts to model mental or behavioural phenomena as 
emergent processes in interconnected networks. True, most psychological theories, 
including connectionism, have accepted that knowledge comes both from genes and 
environment. Today, however, the disagreement among experts concerns a more 
subtle question. Considering that both nature and nurture contribute to the 
development of knowledge, how does knowledge actually emerge in the developmental 
process? Does environment simply trigger of the pre-specified knowledge as, for 
example, Descartes or Chomsky assume, or is there something else to it? 
The well known experts and authors of Rethinking Innateness (Elman et all. 
1996) answer the question ‘where does knowledge come from’ by presenting a 
perspective that knowledge arises from the interaction between nature and nurture. 
This as such would not be an original claim, because many classic developmental 
theories have already embraced interactionist perspective. It seems that the difference 
between the connectionist perspective and that of the classic theories relates to the 
question as to what it means to say that something is innate. For example, the 
researcher working in the framework of connectivism asks: what does it mean exactly 
to say that the child is born with the knowledge that human languages have nouns and 
verbs? In attempting to answer questions like this one, the authors of Rethinking 
Innateness oppose the radical Chomskyan linguistics that argues for extreme 
representational nativism; instead, they encourage researchers to adopt more ‘sensible 
nativism’, giving more weight to the environment. 
But importantly, one of the main ambitions of Rethinking Innateness is to 
provide an exact definition of knowledge. Arguing against loose definitions knowledge 
(e.g. p.367), the authors’ point of departure are the simplest units in the brain structure: 
knowledge ‘ultimately refers to a specific pattern of synaptic connections in the brain’ 
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(p.359). This definition implies their criticism of Chomsky’s and Fodor’s position of 
representational innateness. According to the authors of Rethinking Innateness, no 
higher-level kinds of knowledge are innate, but they develop through interaction with 
the environment. The authors also claim that their developmental perspective provides 
‘the key to the problem of how to get complex behaviours (in the mature animal) from a 
minimal specification (in the genes)’ (p.365).  Development, of course, takes time; its 
‘long period … allows greater time for the environment (both sociocultural and physical) 
to play a role in structuring the developing organism’ (p.365). These are highly 
challenging claims bearing in mind that knowledge in the connectivists perspective 
refers to no more than patterns of synaptic connections in the brain. The gap between 
synaptic connections on the one hand, and sociocultural and physical environment on 
the other, one would think, is enormous. Moreover, the very question of what possibly 
could count as ‘environment’ in the process of development surely will need a very 
careful consideration. 
In one of the final paragraphs of their book the authors refer to the possibility of 
developing social models. They point out that the infant is highly social from early life 
and that they would welcome models which would have ‘a more realistic social ecology’ 
(p.394), accounting for language, awareness of others and group activities. They 
conclude: ‘recent cognitive science may provide a good theoretical basis for developing 
social connectionist networks’, e.g. those based on distributed cognition. 
We can conclude that while Rethinking Innateness offers an elegant theory of 
knowledge, it is the knowledge of genes and not that of humans; environment seems to 
refer to everything that environs genes (and probably also humans?).  In other words, 
this ontology of knowledge is based on genes-environment interaction. We shall see 
that it sharply contrasts with ontology of dialogical knowledge, which is based on the 
Ego-Alter interaction. 
From Social Neuroscience to Politics 
Another mode of thought that has been attracting a great deal of interest during 
the last two decades is social neuroscience. It shares with connectionism a common 
goal: to bring together advances in neurosciences on the one hand, and explanations 
of psychological, including social psychological, phenomena, on the other. While 
approaches within social neuroscience, in contrast with connectivism, do not seem to 
use the term ‘knowledge’, notions like ‘information processing’ or ‘information 
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transmission’ are the common currencies both in connectionism and in social 
neuroscience. Let us consider two social neuroscience approaches, which follow 
somewhat different directions. 
Darwinizing culture 
One approach labels itself as ‘darwinizing culture’ (e.g. Aunger, 2000; 2002). It 
is based on the idea that the nature of sociality can be sought in the structure of the 
brain. This idea has a long past and we can find its rise and fall in the history of 
sciences since the nineteenth century. More recently, Mclean (1973) postulated a 
conception of a triune brain which suggested a direct neurological connection between 
the structure of the brain and the organism’s awareness of others or, one could say, a 
general characteristic of sociality and more specifically, of socio-emotional functions. 
But while biological bases of social behaviour have been well recognized for a 
long time and do not lead to any particular disputes, its newest version, aiming at 
exploring neurological bases of social behaviour and cognition, goes much further. Its 
extreme position is seeking to identify specific centres of sociality located in brain cells 
and even in genes. This perspective uses the concept of a ‘meme’ as a unit of cultural 
inheritance of information residing in the brain that replicates itself ’by leaping from 
brain to brain’ (Dawkins, 1976, p.206) via the process of imitation. It treats memes 
either as germs or as genes and talks about them in terms of epidemiology, i.e. of 
spreading through the contact of brains. Memes are hypothetical particles of culture 
that copy their information ‘into the heads of other people’ (Aunger, 2002, p.18). This 
‘social memetics’ postulates that evolution starts as a neural communication and 
subsequently, by replication, it turns into social communication.  In this way, Aunger 
argues, if replication of information within the brain is viewed as ‘part of the 
evolutionary history of the meme, then it must be included in the project to explain the 
social phenomena’ (ibid. p. 330). And so it is not clear whether psychological and social 
psychological characteristics like, for example, human agency, tension in 
communication and intentionality, have any role to play in this ‘new theory of how we 
think’. 
Functional neuroimaging of complex social activities 
The other neuroscience approach is based on the search for biological and 
physiological correlates of social behaviour. One must remind here, again that the idea 
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has a long history and we can find it already in the nineteenth century. The empirical 
search for psycho-physiological approaches in social psychology has dominated 
various periods of social psychology and we can find it already in the nineteen 
twenties. We can remind, as examples, Riddle’s (1925) work on aggression, the 
famous experiments by Schachter and Singer (1962) on the relation between bodily 
arousal by drugs and emotions, among many others (for a review, see Shapiro and 
Crider, 1969). More recently, extensive explorations of physiological and 
neurophysiological correlates of emotions, empathy, sympathy, motivation, and of 
many other phenomena have been described in Van Lange (2006). Within the most 
recent advances in several techniques of neuroimaging, functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) seems to be making the highest impact on social psychology, promising 
to contribute to the understanding of brain functional behaviour as well as complex 
social activities. A special issue on social neuroscience and political psychology in the 
journal of Political Psychology in 2003 testifies to these expectations. 
The main aim of functional brain imaging appears to be focused on the 
identification of specific regions in the brain and their temporal relationships with the 
performance of well-designed tasks. The end result of this aim would be a detailed 
picture of the processing architecture of brain networks (e.g. Raichle, 2003; Cacioppo 
et al., 2003). Among the topics of complex social phenomena that attract social 
psychologists is political behaviour. For example, Lieberman et al. (2003) attempt to 
understand how the brain (rather than a human being), is wrestling with political 
information. Following this perspective, Albertson and Brehm (2003, p.766) explain 
what it implies. A social neuroscientist 
“should not be looking for political attitudes in the brain so much as what kinds 
of political stimuli activate which systems for political sophisticates and 
nonsophisticates that political information processing concerns the question as 
to ‘how people think about politics rather than what people think about politics” 
(Albertson and Brehm, 2003, p. 766). 
Despite these significant technological advances, one assumes though that the 
answer to the question ‘how people think about politics’ can be given in terms of rather 
general brain activities and functions, as represented by magnetic resonance imaging 
rather than in terms of specific socio-psychological phenomena. For example, will 
neuroimaging differentiate how people think about politics from how they think about 
health, economics, or life and death? 
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Conclusion 
In this first part of the paper I have tried to indicate that the search for scientific 
knowledge has its deep historical and philosophical roots in philosophical rationalism 
and empiricism. Today, it reflects itself in the in researchers’ anxieties to provide an 
exact definition of knowledge and of information processing in genes, memes or in 
localised areas of the brain. Its ambition is, moreover, to extend these exact 
conceptions of knowledge to complex human social activities. However, these elegant 
models are unable to suggest, as yet, how such an extension could be achieved – if 
indeed it could be achieved. And thus, the main question remains: may one reasonably 
assume that the epistemic differences between ‘knowledge’ of genes and of memes, 
as well as information involved in functional activities in localised areas of the brain 
could be extended to human knowledge constructed in mundane life, know-how skills, 
innovations, common-sense knowledge and practical daily activities? Do all these 
highly diverse activities justify using the single term ‘knowledge’? Where is left human 
agency, intentionality, self-other interdependencies in the acquisition of knowledge? Or 
perhaps, should we assume that they do not count in the construction of knowledge?  
Dialogical Knowledge 
The tremendous gap between ‘knowledge’ as a mental representation, or as a 
pattern of synaptic connections, in which reality and its content has disappeared, 
sharply contrasts with the dialogical theory of social knowledge. This gap, I argue, 
cannot be bridged either by theoretical or empirical means because the former and the 
latter approaches are based on incommensurable presuppositions. 
In order to explain this claim, the second part of this paper will be devoted to 
outlining the dialogical theory of knowledge; this theory 
• restores knowledge as a human activity that has something to do with the 
content of the real world 
• ties knowledge closely with dialogical communication 
• and emphasizes that humans are concerned with their life experiences. 
I shall presuppose that knowledge is not generated by a single knower, whether 
the by the individual in the sense of the French philosopher René Descartes, or by the 
collective in the sense of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, or by a connectivist 
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gene or a socio-evolutionary and hypothetical meme. I shall presuppose, instead, that 
knowledge is generated mutually by humans, specifically by the self and other(s) (or 
the Ego-Alter), whoever the self and the other(s) might be. The self and other(s) are in 
a complementary dialogical engagement in communication and an essential feature of 
their interaction is that in and through communication their thought and knowledge 
develops. Before I characterize the concept of knowledge in this theory, I need to turn 
to the concepts of interaction and dialogicality so that their fundamental role in the 
dialogical theory of knowledge can be brought into focus. 
Interaction between Self and Others 
The point of departure for the theory of dialogical knowledge will be the concept 
of interaction, and in the present context, specifically interaction in social development. 
When I speak about interaction as a basic notion in social development, I mean more 
than that the infant is highly social from early life and that therefore ‘a more realistic 
social ecology’ (Elman et al. p.394, see above), should be developed. Instead, what I 
mean here is that while each individual is born as an individual in the physical and 
biological sense with his/her own body and brain, and with capacities for intellectual 
and linguistic development, he/she is also born with a social sense, that is, with 
openness towards others. I further assume that this social capacity cannot be regarded 
as something accompanying the development of thought, communication, social 
knowledge, reflexivity and the self; instead, it is a fundamental characteristic of these 
processes and they would not exist without this social capacity.  
It is in this sense that the Ego and the Alter (the Ego-Alter) co-constitute one 
another in a dynamic figure-ground set-up, both transforming in and through dialogical 
communication and multifaceted symbolic interactions. In developmental psychology 
the innate ‘openness to others’ has been given different names. Researchers choose 
their specific names in order to express their theoretical priorities and their focus of 
interest – and so we have, for example, ‘innate intersubjectivity’ (Trevarthen, 1992), 
‘pre-morality’ (Linnel and Rommetveit, 1998), ‘virtual other’ (Bråten, 1992), ‘attunement 
to the attunement of the other’ (Rommetveit, 1992), ‘a priori trust’ (Simmel, 1950) and 
perhaps other names. All these notions refer to some kind of ‘innate sociality’ – which 
is conceived as a potential for further self/other development. This potential, however, 
does not imply the presuppositions of the approach called above the ‘darwinizing 
culture’. It is not based on the postulate of ‘social memetics’, according to which 
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cultural phenomena and complex forms of social communication can be explained on 
the basis of replication of information within hypothetical memes. Instead, athough 
interaction between the self and others starts as a biological/social potentiality, very 
soon after the infant’s birth (Newson, 1979; Papoušek and Papoušek, 1975; Stern, 
1985; Trevarthen, 1979; 1992), this potentiality is actualised and differentiates itself into 
the search for intersubjectivity of the one hand and the search for the social recognition 
on the other, both involving tension, asymmetries and mutualities in communication 
(Marková, 2003).  These fundamental phenomena involving interaction between the 
self and others have been well explored in sociology and in developmental social 
psychology. 
 The German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1918) views the Ego-Alter 
interaction as an essential characteristic in the process of socialisation, communication 
and thinking. For Simmel, interaction in humans starts as the orientation of one human 
towards another one; he calls it a-priori trust. Trust is a feeling that is immediately 
apprehended and therefore, it is not always conscious. Simmel (1950) views trust both 
as situated within - as well as outside - the boundaries of knowledge that individuals 
can form of one another. Without trust society could hardly become established, and 
instead, it would run a considerable risk of falling into pieces. At the same time, Simmel 
(1955) conceives of conflict as a driving force of social movement, which draws 
individuals and members of social groups together. For him, although conflict involves 
negative relations, it also leads to innovation and dynamics. 
 The early part of the twentieth century is marked by original theories of 
interactionist social developmental psychologists, including James Mark Baldwin 
(1861-1934), George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) and Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934) who 
have proposed that self-consciousness develops through mutual interaction of the Ego-
Alter. In their theoretical approaches they used, respectively, terms like the ‘dialectic of 
social growth’, ‘conversation of gestures’ and ‘inter- and intra-psychological processes’. 
Baldwin viewed the concept of the ‘dialectic of personal growth’ as a process of mutual 
interaction between the Ego-Alter through give-and-take relationships (Baldwin, 1895, 
p. 342). He postulated a theory according to which the self is originally crude, 
unreflective and largely organic, and it is through interpersonal interaction that it 
becomes ‘purified and clarified’. 
 George Herbert Mead's analysis of the interaction between the self and others 
was based on his presupposition that the self has an ability to call out in oneself a set 
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of definite responses that it acquires from others (Mead, 1934, p. 277). As the self 
develops this ability, it becomes an object to itself: it regards itself through the eyes of 
others. In his essay on ‘The Objective Reality of Perspectives’, Mead (1927) develops this 
idea, which includes all environmental conditions around the self. But equally, the baby 
learns, first through basic needs, such as hunger, coldness and other kinds of discomfort 
to posit him-/herself as experiencer and agent attempting to exert control over his/her 
environment. Testing the limits of his or her ability to control events and to explore objects 
in his/her environment becomes facilitates the child in defining the boundaries between 
the self and the environment. Environmental conditions, Mead insists, exist only for 
concrete human agents who use them in their own idiosyncratic ways. Human agents, on 
their part, are never imprisoned in their own little cages but are orientated towards others 
and their perspectives. 
 Vygotsky’s (1979, p. 29) analysis of self-consciousness, again, is based on the 
interaction between the Ego and the Alter. For him, ‘[t]he mechanism of knowing oneself 
(self-awareness) and the mechanism for knowing others are one and the same’. 
Consciousness of speaking and of social experience both emerge simultaneously and 
together with one another. According to Vygotsky, there is no difference between the fact 
that one can repeat one’s own word and that of the other person. This capacity grows for 
self- and other-communication simultaneously. Moreover, words also express the social 
and historical nature of human self and other-awareness. 
The idea of the interaction between the self and others was also fundamental in 
neo-Kantian philosophy of dialogism in the early part of the twentieth century. The 
neo-Kantians based their philosophy on the ‘dialogical principle’, which involved the 
interaction between ‘I’ and ‘you’ (or ‘I’ and ‘Thou’), that is, the relation of co-authors in 
communication. The dialogical principle, the neo-Kantians argued, is established and 
maintained through speech and communication and it enables people to express their 
life experiences, emotions and concerns; it facilitates their construction of social reality. 
The dialogical approach drew attention not only to the social nature of 
humankind, but it also placed a considerable weight on the idea that the activity of 
thought creates human reality. Michail Bakhtin (1895-1975) and his Circle, which 
included scholars like Voloshinov and Medvedev in Russia, expressed the interaction 
between the Ego-Alter above all through their ideas of self- and other-consciousness. 
Bakhtin argued that the most important acts constituting self-consciousness are 
determined by a relationship toward another consciousness and through 
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communication: to be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself  
(Bakhtin, 1984, p.287). In other words, consciousness is only collective: ‘justification 
cannot be self-justification, recognition cannot be self-recognition. I receive my name 
from others, and it exists for others (self-nomination is imposture)’ (Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 
287-288). One consciousness always stands in relation to one another. Even looking at 
oneself in the mirror in not a sole activity: ‘I look at myself simultaneously with the eyes 
or myself and of the others, so we have here an intersection of different world views, an 
intersection of two consciousnesses. Human life is an open-ended dialogue’ (ibid. p. 
293), in which a reified model of the world is being replaced by a dialogical one. 
In communication, words  are never neutral signs. Neutrality can be only 
artificially imposed, but daily speech is never neutral. Since words are always doubly 
orientated, i.e. towards the self and towards the other, they are always open to different 
interpretations and in this sense they are ambivalent. Dialogical relations are not 
engaged solely in search for intersubjectivity and a peaceful contemplation. Instead, 
cognitions and affects are in tension; they clash, judge and evaluate one another. 
Bakhtin (1981, p.314) foregrounds dialogue as a strife of divergent perspectives: ‘one 
point of view is opposed to another, one evaluation opposed to another…this dialogic 
tension...permits authorial intentions to be realised’ in heterogeneity of languages and 
of ideas. Understanding, precisely because it is active, is always evaluative. 
Dialogicality 
The ideas of interaction and of the Bakhtinian dialogism lead us to the concept 
of dialogicality (Marková, 2003). I am using the term ‘dialogicality’ to characterise the 
fundamental capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about 
social realities in terms of the Alter. I assume that this capacity is such a basic 
condition of human existence that we can talk about it as ontology, i.e. the existence, of 
the human mind. What the human individual has become and what his/her prospects 
are for the future – all that is due to this capacity. Each individual lives in the world of 
others, interacts with others, influences others and is influenced by them. 
Consciousness must be in interaction with another consciousness in order to achieve 
its proper existence. 
The ‘Ego-Alter’ is an abstract and theoretical term and in concrete dialogical 
situations it is always expressed as a specific Self – Other(s) e.g. ‘I -you’, ‘minority - 
majority’, ‘I- group’, ‘group - another group’, ‘I - culture’, and so on. In each such case 
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their dyadic relation is dynamic, one constituent affecting the other one, and so leading 
to changes in both constituents who communicate, simultaneously, in and through 
different selves and others. For example, a conversation between two interlocutors is 
more than an exchange of messages here and now. Not only do the interlocutors bring 
into communication their different positions or identification (e.g. now speaking as a 
friend, now as a professional, now as a member of a political party, etc), but they also 
express the point of view of their culture, doxa or any other ‘third party’. 
Constructing knowledge through communicative genres 
In the dialogical perspective knowledge is characterised broadly: it includes 
historically, socially and newly co-constructed meanings of humans; interpretations and 
re-interpretations of symbols; doxa transmitted from generation to generation. It equally 
concerns knowledge that changes in the process of public discourse; and that is static 
as well as dynamic. In other words, there are diverse forms of knowledge ranging from 
theoretical and symbolic ones, to know-how skills, and to knowledge involved in social 
practices. To that extent, the dialogical theory of knowledge is incommensurable with 
the theory of knowledge that is based on narrowly well-defined knowledge of synaptic 
patterns in genes. 
 If the dialogical theory of knowledge stems from ontology of the Ego and the 
Alter, then the construction of knowledge involves, in each instance of knowing, these 
two interacting knowers and the object of knowledge. Thus, while many theories of 
knowledge involve the knower (whether the individual or gene etc) and the object of 
knowledge, in the dialogical approach the minimum unit of knowing is the 
Ego-Alter-Object. This triadic relation is dynamic, involves different kinds of intentions 
and is multifaceted; we can say that mundane knowledge is often constructed in and 
through different styles of communication that we shall call communicative genres. 
The term ‘communicative genre’ comes from the literary theory, where it refers 
to the author’s way of achieving unity and continuity of the literary work. But the term is 
slippery and has been criticized for its ambiguity. In ordinary speech, communicative 
genres are social conventions. They are socially constructed and socially maintained. 
There can be no genre that belongs purely to the individual but through genres 
individuals express their belongingness to a certain culture or group as well as a 
commitment to particular social practices. Communicative genres can be characterised 
as temporarily fixed symbolic communicative forms that speakers and listeners 
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mutually recognize as having specific purposes, intentions, aims and topics in 
communication. They are expressed by specific lexical, grammatical, compositional 
and thematic means. Although they are conventions, they are dynamic; they emerge, 
are sustained for a while and change into new genres. 
Different communicative genres involve various kinds of the Ego-Alter relations, 
intentions and motivations and therefore, they contribute to the co-construction of 
knowledge in different ways. They employ specific features of language and a variety 
of activities, e.g. persuasion, argumentation, negotiation of meaning or simply the 
transmission of messages. However, communicative genres are characterised by 
specific and prevailing communicative activities, e.g. attempt to influence the other 
person, to negotiate outcome, to give advice, and so on. However, it does not mean 
that a communicative genre would involve only one activity and exclude others. Genres 
always include a mixture of activities like persuasion, argumentation, conversation, and 
so on.  
Co-construction of knowledge through communication genres involves different 
kinds of intentionality. Already in the early part of the twentieth century Carl Bűhler 
(1982) identified three meanings of intentionality. First, a person expresses what 
he/she has in mind, whether it is content, ideas, feelings and so on. At the same time, 
the speaker addresses someone and attempts to direct the other’s attention to him-
/herself as the speaker. And finally, the speaker refers to certain objects or contents by 
means of speaking. Graumann (1990), building on Bűhler’s conception of intentionality, 
points out that a triple intentionality is present in each speech act. First, the speaker 
has intention to utter his/her thought to addressee and this intention is not necessarily 
conscious. Second, the speaker has intention to communicate with another. Finally, the 
speaker has intention to refer to specific things or events. Yet the speech act 
necessarily involves other kinds of intentionality. People intend to create history of a 
particular kind but it may turn to something different than what they originally 
envisaged. Intentionality brings into communication tension between the speakers and 
the object of their knowledge: intentionality is fundamentally different from the idea that 
messages merely spread from person to person (or from meme to meme). Different 
communication genres bring into focus different kinds of intentionality. Let us consider 
some examples. 
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Persuasion 
The Ego and the Alter influence one another in and through speech, each 
having desire to be mutually acknowledged as agent. Their mutual influence may be 
unintentional and can take place implicitly without awareness; alternatively, it can be 
intentional and explicit. In the latter case it is usually called persuasion. It is often said 
that persuasion, an attempt to alter the mind of others by means of communication, is 
as old as human speech. 
Just like other forms of dialogical communication, persuasion can involve 
different kinds of the Ego and the Alter. For example, persuasion can take place 
between individuals at an interpersonal level; between individuals and groups; between 
minorities and majorities; between the media and audience; and so on. The speakers 
persuade one another both through silences and verbalisations, like rhetoric, authentic 
statements, as well as through deception and secrecy, and through direct and indirect 
meanings. Persuasive communication can display diverse and even opposite ways of 
thinking which are suited to, and articulated in, specific contexts. We may persuade by 
flattering, by making nuances in meaning, we may appeal to the third party and so on. 
In other words, like any form of communication, persuasion displays heterogeneous 
forms. For great novelists and writers heterogeneous forms of persuasion are taken for 
granted; dialogue provides infinite resources for exploring the creative nature of 
conversation, dialogical cognition, emotions and, we can say, for exploring the human 
drama in its entirety. Considering the above discussed kinds of intentionality, 
intentionality in persuasion is directed above all at the other interlocutor: persuasion is 
characterised by explicit intention to accomplish changes of opinions, beliefs or 
otherwise, in the other.  
The propagator or an educator may represent the institution and transmit the 
doctrine or the message. In this case, the institution must make the object of education 
or of propaganda credible in order to be acceptable to the addressee. This may not be 
always an easy task. For example, during the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s 
governments were delivering messages urging that everybody protects him-/herself 
from catching HIV/AIDS. Yet some addressees, to whom this message was directed, 
become suspicious of the ulterior motive of institutions or the State. For example, the 
slogan: ‘AIDS: you are as safe as you want to be’ reminded the public that it is 
everybody’s responsibility to protect themselves against the virus. The slogan was 
presented as part of the campaign in the United Kingdom called ‘Don’t die of 
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ignorance’, in the attempt to stop the spread of AIDS during the 1980s when the 
epidemic was at its peak. However, some people viewed this slogan was part of the 
official propaganda that implicitly emphasized traditional societal and moral values, 
insinuating that homosexuals were responsible for the spread of AIDS. Such 
discrimination of homosexuals, in Watney’s (1990) view, was based on ‘the typically 
individualistic approach of the work of the health Education Authority, whose adverts 
share a common by-line, AIDS: You’re as safe as you want to be’ (Watney, 1990, 
p.171). 
Argumentation 
Argumentation is a language based activity in which an individual supports 
his/her view with reasons and considers alternative perspectives with the ultimate goal 
of getting that view accepted by the addressee. While intentionality in persuasion is 
driven by the persuader’s interest to influence the other, the focus of argumentation is 
on intentionality directed towards the object of communication in and through 
construction of arguments and counter-arguments. In this process, the participants 
display multiple perspectives opposing one another, and evaluating one another’s 
message. As a resource for knowledge building, argumentation involves a constant 
reviewing of positions from which conceptions regarding the world are continually 
formulated, reviewed and transformed (Leitao, 2000). Like persuasion, argumentation 
can take place at interpersonal, intergroup and even intrapersonal level. 
At the intrapersonal level, the individual can carry out an internal dialogue, i.e. 
postulate ‘the inner Alter’. Internal dialogue could be an attempt, by means of inner 
argumentation, to solve the author’s conflict, whether relational, personal, and moral, 
choice-related and so on.  ‘The inner Alter’ can take multiple and multifaceted forms, 
for example, as participants’ reference groups, conscience, individual and collective 
memories, commitments and loyalties, the selves’ internal dialogues, their mutually 
shared knowledge, the distrusted Alter, the superimposed Alter and otherwise. This 
multiplicity is not surprising because, as already emphasised above, a concrete 
dialogue in which the Ego and the Alter are involved is no more than a momentary 
episode in the life-long continuing dialogue. Each subject enters a concrete dialogue 
with all their previous social experience which, unavoidably, shapes their encounters. 
Equally important, ’the inner Alter’ also manifests itself linguistically and through 
diverse speech activities of the Ego and Alter. We may, in and through internal 
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dialogue express distrust of our communication partner but hide, for one reason or 
other, an external expression of that feeling. 
Conclusion 
I have tried to present in this paper the old dilemma concerning different forms 
of knowledge. In one case knowledge refers to a scientific ‘kind of marble temple 
shining on a hill’ and in   the other case, to the world of ‘concrete personal experiences 
to which the street belongs … multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy, 
painful and perplex’, is not new. William James (1975, pp. 17-18) discussed these two 
separate worlds as a dilemma in philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
We can see that the dilemma has not disappeared. Instead, the simple and classic 
sanctuary has become a model of many social sciences. 
This paper argues for dialogical knowledge based on the ontology of the 
Ego-Alter and consequently, it views knowledge in terms of the joint construct of the 
Ego-Alter. Bringing communication genres into the centre of the theory of social 
knowledge has both theoretical and practical implications.  
On the theoretical side, different communication genres draw attention to 
heterogeneous ways in which knowledge is constructed as well as to different 
purposes of knowledge construction. For example, construction of knowledge in and 
through persuasion foregrounds the power of belief, the leader, personal charisma, 
control, and so on. In other words, it brings out the interaction between the Ego and 
Alter. Argumentation, on the other hand, foregrounds the negotiation of opposite 
perspectives, the power of evidence and of argument. In other words, it emphasises 
the Ego-Object relation. Other genres, for example, conversation in the construction of 
knowledge, might builds on socially shared experience, on hidden and implicit 
meanings. Communicative genres, therefore, bring out different agendas associated 
into the knowledge construction. 
On the practical side, all forms of higher education are concerned, in one way 
or other, with the construction of knowledge. But which forms of knowledge should be 
privileged? As we have seen, different approaches in the construction of knowledge 
may be conceptually incommensurable. This does not mean, though that we can 
ignore some approaches and treat them as non-existent because despite their 
incommensurability, different approaches use concepts like interaction, ‘knowledge’, 
‘culture’, ‘representations’, ‘language’, ‘complex social behaviour’. The student may not 
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immediately see that contents of these concepts fundamentally differ when used in 
different approaches, e.g. in connectivist, neurobiological, computational, dialogical and 
interactionist. The clarity in use of concepts is essential for the development of 
knowledge (yet another usage of the term of ‘knowledge’) in social sciences. 
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